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Abstract Machines: Samuel Beckett and Philosophy after Deleuze and Guattari. By GARIN DOWD. Amsterdam/New York, Rodopi, 2007. 319 pp. Pb E64.00. This book examines what it means to read Beckett after Deleuze-Guattari (a term which, in the interests of space, I adopt here as the best compromise when referring to Deleuze's work both with and without Guattari). Dowd identifies five meanings for this preposition: in the wake of, in the style of, following, displacing and belatedly encountered through (p. 18). He argues that Beckett and Deleuze-Guattari reconfigure similar problems from the history of philosophy -those of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Leibniz -and he aims to 'let the philosophical in' to Beckett's work (p. 20) and to pay heed to the reverberations of philosophy which are everywhere apparent in the oeuvre. Refreshingly, his interest is not in 'proof of influence' but rather in juxtaposing a coincidental concern in Beckett and Deleuze-Guattari. Dowd is very much in command of his material, which covers a wide swathe of the history of philosophy, and the complexity of the analyses means that the book is suited only for the most philosophically minded Beckett scholars. Chapter 1 introduces Dowd's concept of 'shadow hospitality', through which he examines the problematic way in which Deleuze-Guattari play host to literature in their writings, and compares this to the similarly fraught hosting of philosophy in Beckett's work. Dowd reads Beckett's work as functioning like a Deleuzoguattarian 'abstract machine' -a term which refers to something like the mobility of creation, a becoming which is aformal and which thus demands a new way of thinking which cannot be represented. Chapter 2 thus argues that, by virtue of its title, Murphy (Greek morph e, meaning 'form'), both offers and withholds the concept of form as configured in the philosophical heritage, specifically through the novel's concern with the face. This extends into a discussion of the evasion of figuration in The Lost Ones. This latter section provides an original, cogent and overdue analysis of the manner in which this text plays host to concepts of the One of monotheism. Chapter 3 then examines Beckett's use of Leibnizian concepts, and is again a rigorous analysis of this area. Indeed, all Dowd's readings of the philosophical heritage against Beckett are superb, but -and this is my main reservation with the book -this is because it is at such points that his analysis is most aware of Beckett's resistance to philosophy. In contrast, the sections which read Beckett through Deleuze-Guattari offer no sense of such tension: the readings work a little too well. For all its competent handling of the Deleuzoguattarian concepts, the book is at its best when these are left aside (as in the discussion of The Lost Ones). Although Dowd is careful to articulate the dangers of applying a philosophical system to Beckett's work, he never actually demonstrates how this is so in the specific case when the Deleuzoguattarian system confronts Beckett. Too often the Beckett passages quoted feel a little like examples, there simply to illustrate this system, and Beckett thus comes after Deleuze-Guattari in a way which Dowd would seek to avoid. Having said that, there is much in this book that is of interest: a case of the sum of the parts adding up to more than the whole. London, Verso, 2006. viii þ 199 pp. Pb £14.99. The opening words of this study declare an ambition 'to go right to the heart of Deleuze's philosophy'. Two hundred pages later, on arrival at the heart, a mini-dagger is plunged in: '[T]hose of us who still seek to change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look for our inspiration elsewhere'. Where that 'elsewhere' might lie hangs in the air, and appropriately so, in a book that presents Deleuze as forever piloting out of the world of the actual. For Hallward, Deleuze's brand of univocal ontology, which pervades his thought, sets up a dynamic and indissociable link between being, creativity and thought. Being becomes creativity by sidestepping the material, the creatural. Pure thought is attained, in other words, by becoming imperceptible. This is not, as Hallward is at pains to point out, synonymous with annihilation; a more sympathetic framework would be that of theophany, to be understood not as transcendence but as a kind of infused creative force or energy. Hallward's itinerary is a meticulous one, leading through the constraints of the creatural -'human beings have a particular affinity for thoughtlessness' (p. 55) -to subtractive processes such as mystical kenosis or other forms of deterritorialization, and the liberating potentialities of art, literature and pre-eminently (because requiring no medium) philosophy. One curious aspect of this analytical journey is that its culmination comes as something of a downer as well as of a surprise. Somewhere out of this committed and often exhilarating encounter with the feasibly 'redemptive' Deleuze, I anticipated the
